

Testing Lessons Perfected in Mordor



Paco Hope




About Me

- Software Security Consultant 14 years
 - Software security: code, design, risk
 - Financial, gaming, retail
 - Source code, architecture, security testing
- (ISC)² European Advisory Council
 - CISSP Exam author
 - CSSLP Exam author









@pacohope




Muth and Magic



Myth 1 Security Defects are Different

Pervasiveness



Security, like other NFRs, is cross-cutting & emergent

One bug/flaw can ripple across the whole system

Security Defects Can Be Different

Some Functional Defects:

"we mean to do X, but instead we do Y"

Some Security Defects:
"we do X just like we intend to.
As a side-effect, Y, which is bad."

Security Testing Paradoxes



- One defect report?
 - Might have hundreds of test cases
- Hundreds of defect reports?
 - Might get fixed in one place
- Goldilocks Principle
 - Probably somewhere in the middle



Muth 2 Security Testers Can Do Special Things

Using Software While in Mid-Air

Myth: Security testers can find defects that testers can't find

Reality: Testers can usually test features that security testers cannot reach



Probably a functional tester


Security And The Front Door

Security testers often:

- Are time boxed
- Lack domain expertise
- Lack use case awareness
- Lack tools / access

Result:

- Low impact
- Low coverage
- Shallow coverage
- Poor explanations



Acquirer

Myth 3

You Need a Magic Wand

Supplies





CITY OF LONDON





Supplies

Test Inputs and Test Harnesses



Logs and Profiling Info

User Stories
Use Cases
Requirements

There Are Some Security Tools

- We will talk about some soon...
- You can make major impacts without fancy tools
- None of it is rocket surgery





Principle 1

Orcs, Mot Elves



Elf

- Capricious
- Friendly
- Magical
- Not real

orc |

noun (pl.orcs |)
a dumb brute with a singleminded purpose of malevolent

destruction.



- Stupid
- One blunt tool
- Not a big deal when alone
- Deployed in hoardes



Your software

Give me some data Give me some data

Give me some data Give me some data Give me some data

Give me some data Give me some data

Give me some data





Putting Orcs To Work



- Write a program to generate security input data
- Write a program to check if it works
- Run an attack unattended
- Test every possible password

Principle 2

No Gold Required

Free Potions and Spells


- Many tools free, as in beer
- Most automate for you
- Cheat sheets
- Tutorials



- OWASP
 - What to find
 - Tips to do it right
- CVSS
 - Scoring security issues
- Kali Linux
 - Pre-built, bootable
 - Rich tool chain

Free Spells

- OWASP
- Twitter
- Mailinglists
- etc.



ha.ckers

XSS (Cross Site Scripting) Cheat Sheet Calculator Esp: for filter evasion

By RSnake

Note: this is a simple calculator for doing basic transformation functions that are regularly useful for XSS. If you need something more robust, please consider using Hackvertor.

Character Encoding Calculator

ASCII Text:

<img< th=""><th>SRC=</th><th>onmouseover="alert('xxs')"></th><th></th></img<>	SRC=	onmouseover="alert('xxs')">	
			/
Ence	ode	Clear	

Hex Value:

URL:
%3C%49%4D%47%20%53%52%43%3D%20%6F%6E%6D%6F%75%73%65%6F%7
Decode Hex to ASCII
HTML (with semicolons):
<img src="&</td"/>
Decode Hex Entities to ASCII

mal Value:

HTML (without semicolons):
<IMG SRC= onm&#

Decode Dec to ASCII

Base64 Value (a more robust base64 calculator can be found here)

Base64:

PEINRyBTUkM9IG9ubW91c2VvdmVyPSJhbGVydCgneHhzJykiPg ==


Decode Base64



HTTP Proxies


Standard technique, used for lots of reasons

- Speed up Internet access
- Filter undesirable or malicious content
- Prevent data leakage
- Provide anonymity




Crystal Ball: Scrying Data

- Don't just sit there, change something
- Even "secure" connections can be proxied



Crystal Ball: All Seeing Eye

Monitor, intercept, and rewrite traffic in your local proxy



Principle 4


Use a Spell Book


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
- Casting spells (Commands)
- Crystal scrying (Scanning)
- Poison pills (Malicious input)
- Animating the dead (Simulations)


Ingredients

- Eye of newt...
- Wing of bat...
- SQL character sequences
- HTML sequences
- Cookies of evil
- XML of Malice









javascript:alert(document.forms[0].to.value="something")

#document.forms[0].to.value=1

⊜ Java§cript

In Your Spell Book

Got XML?

- External XML Entity (XXE)
- Billion laughs

Got HTML?

Malicious HTML

Got a Database?

Malicious SQL

```
x' or 2=2; --
><a href=...
'`;!--"<xss>=&{(
 <!DOCTYPE billion [
 <!ELEMENT billion (#PCDATA)>
 <!ENTITY haO "ha">
 <!ENTITY hal "&haO;&haO;">
 <!ENTITY ha2 "&ha1;&ha1;">
```

Add These Ingredients Everywhere



- User attributes
- Data fields
- Imported external data
- Places where "this couldn't happen"

Remember

1. Orcs, not Elves

Armies of dumb,
 brute labour

2. No Gold Required

Tools are largely free or cheap

3. Crystal Ball

Proxy connections and tamper with them

4. Use a Spell Book

Repeated application of well-known malicious inputs

Go forth and conquer!

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